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Members of social networks are given op-portunities to bestow positive recognition
upon one another by means of constructs such
as “likes” and “retweets.” Although recipi-
ents no doubt experience utility from these
actions, one might question why these con-
structs with no intrinsic value for the sender
are exchanged at all. Here we formulate a
metric for the prestige of a member of a so-
cial network based on his or her place within
the network and the rate at which “likes” are
exchanged within his or her social circle. Sim-
ulation reveals that the 1% most strategically-
optimized networks exchange likes at an aver-
age rate 23.5% higher than that of their ran-
dom counterparts. This suggests that purely
strategic agents, even with no concern for al-
truism or the general welfare, experience util-
ity from giving social gratification. Further,
we show that prestige-maximization creates a
selective pressure for structural features asso-
ciated with social networks including cluster-
ing and the small-world property.
Introduction
Measures of prestige in social network theory typi-
cally rely on features of the network structure itself
including, for instance, closeness centrality, between-
ness centrality, and eigenvector centrality. [1] These
neglect that in many applications an actor’s pres-
tige depends not only on the quantity or quality of
connections (as in the degree and eigenvector models,
respectively) but also the nature of the interactions be-
tween connected nodes. Actors may be differentially
endorsed by those with whom they are connected;
thus each must strategize to allocate endorsements
in the way that maximizes his or her own prestige.
Such a system is clearly in effect in the online social
network (OSN) where users may bestow recognition
upon those with whom they are connected in the form
of a “like,” “share,” “retweet,” etc. [2, 3] Here we will
examine the strategy involved in the endowment of
“likes” which are of particular interest because to give
one neither demands an explicit cost nor provides an
explicit benefit to the giver. Nonetheless, transfers of
social gratification behave as though they are scarce,
raising the question of how and why they are traded
within an OSN and what large-scale behaviors should
emerge when network participants exchange “likes”
in such a way that they strategically maximize their
prestige.
Like Centrality
Consider a network of n actors who are connected
according to an adjacency matrix F which satisfies
Fij =
{
1 if i and j are “friends”
0 otherwise
(1)
where friendship is considered neither directed nor
reflexive; thus F is symmetric and hollow. Suppose
that each member i produces a stream of social decla-
rations, or “posts” for which an actor j may declare
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approval in the form of a “like” when fij = 1. Let rij
be the rate at which the actor j endows likes upon i.
Next define the like centrality (LC) of i to be the sum
of the rates at which i’s friends like i’s posts, scaled
by each of their own LCs, all normalized by the sum
of i’s friends’ LCs. That is,
Li =
∑n
j=1 FijrijLj∑n
j=1 FijLj
. (2)
The motivation of i is then to improve his or her
friends’ prestiges so as to inflate the efficacies of the
likes he receives, but not to the extent that it drives
up the average neighbors’ prestige and belittles i by
comparison. This metric resembles eigenvector cen-
trality conceptually in that one’s own centrality is
proportional to the sum of those of his or her friends,
though its quadratic nature makes it dissimilar com-
putationally.
When each actor is minimizing his or her own LC,
∂Li/∂rki = 0 for all connected i and k. That allows
(2) to be rearranged and implicitly differentiated to
give
L∗i =
∑n
j=1 Fijrij∂Li/∂rki∑n
j=1 Fij∂Li/∂rki
(3)
for all k connected to i. A mean field approximation
in which an individual’s LC depends only on those
with whom he or she is immediately connected yields
a system in which a given person receives likes at
the same rate from all his friends; that is, all the
nonzero elements of each row of the r matrix are
equal. (2) must then reduce to Li = rij for all j
that are connected to i. In the next section we will
examine the exact system without the approximation.
OSN Simulation
We begin by generating 500,000 random graphs of size
n = 10 using a Baraba´si-Albert algorithm in which
new vertices are added with two edges. [4] This model
is chosen to simulate features of real OSN including,
for instance, preferential attachment, small average
path length, and high clustering. Each directed con-
nection is assigned a uniformly-distributed random
post rate between 0 and 1. The likeness centrality
of each actor is then computed by numerically solv-
ing (2) which yields for each network a system of 10
Figure 1: Like rate distributions for strategic (orange)
and random (black) agents, shown with their
respective means.
quadratic equations in 10 variables.1
The optimalities of the whole networks are com-
puted as the sums of the LCs of their individual
members. This quantity appears to precisely follow
a Gaussian distribution whose log-likelihood is maxi-
mized when µ = 5.0000 and σ2 = 0.3142 which coin-
cide with the raw moments of the data. The top 1%
(approximately 5000) most prestigious networks are se-
lected to represent the most effective LC-maximizing
agents. It would be insufficient to consider only in-
dividuals of high prestige because those with whom
they are interacting would not necessarily be acting
strategically.
Like Endowment
We inquire as to whether strategic agents benefit
from giving likes. As seen in Figure 1, agents in
optimal networks allocate 23.5% more likes than their
random counterparts. The difference is manifested
in the heavier tail2 of the strategic curve, suggest-
ing that LC-maximizing networks contain a larger
proportion of highly-generous agents. We can also
predict with high accuracy the ideal rate for an indi-
vidual to give likes given his or her location within
the network. Averaging the rate at which likes are
1We neglect the solution in which all the LCs become vanish-
ingly small.
2Note that the strategic curve decays as a nested exponential
and is by no means “heavy” in the formal sense.
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Figure 2: Traditional centrality measures as predictors
for an agent’s like-giving rate.
given by actors of each possible degree centrality,
regression yields likes given = −1.599 + 0.6635 ×
degree centrality with R2 > 0.9999. Without
averaging, R2 = 0.9603 and a scattered residual plot
confirms that a linear fit is appropriate. The same
comparison is shown in Figure 2 but for betweenness,
closeness, and eigenvector centralities.
The deviation from the mean field approximation
Li = rij can be tested based on the simulation data.
In particular, we compute for the strategic networks
the distribution of the statistic rij/Li − 1, which we
call δij , for all connected i and j. The probability
density function for δ is depicted in the first histogram
of Figure 3. We see then that although there appears
to be a cusp at δ = 0, the number of likes received
by an actor can be more than double his or her like
centrality. Next consider an error metric ij = rij−Li.
Using this to eliminate rij in (2) and rearranging
yields
n∑
j=1
FijijLj = 0 (4)
which is trivially true in the mean field case but must
also apply in general. We now examine the distri-
bution of the ij , shown in the second histogram of
Figure 3. This reveals a remarkable bimodal distribu-
Figure 4: Relative clustering frequencies between random
and strategic social network structures.
tion in which the mean field peak at  = 0 is smaller
than an additional nontrivial extremum at  ≈ −0.64.
That is, there is a strong tendency, exhibited by 82%
of the rational agents, to enjoy a like centrality higher
than what would be predicted based on their like-
receiving rate and the mean field approximation. It
must be concluded that it is insufficient for strategic
individuals to assume that their activity only affects
their immediate neighbors in the network; the inac-
curacy of the approximation illustrates that social
influence spreads non-negligibly to friends-of-friends
and perhaps beyond.
Emergent Network Features
For every sample in the simulation described above, a
new network is randomly generated. Therefore, it has
the power to test the fitness of not only the allocation
of likes as detailed above, but also the structure of the
underlying network. Here we present a comparison
between two network properties generated by strategic
and random methods: clustering and small diameter,
which are both known features of networks in a wide
variety of applications.
Clustering
In the manner of Watts and Strogatz, [5] define C, the
local clustering coefficient for a vertex v, the propor-
tion of the potential connections between v’s friends
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Figure 3: Distribution of δ- and -type deviations from the mean field approximation of strategic behavior.
which are included in the network. The mean clus-
tering coefficient C¯ is then defined as the average of
the local coefficients over the entire network and acts
as a metric for the tendency of cliques to form, as
they do in real social networks. It is observed that
strategic networks tend to have higher mean cluster-
ing coefficients than random ones. Histogram bin
counts for the probability density functions are com-
pared between the two populations and displayed in
Figure 4. Probability differences are given as percent
differences from random to strategic, so a positive
quantity indicates that the given level of clustering
occurs more frequently in strategic systems.
Diameter
The diameter of a network is defined as the maximum
of all the network’s geodesic path lengths between
pairs of nodes. The nature of the Baraba´si-Albert
algorithm with the simulation’s particular parameters
allow only networks of diameters 2, 3, and 4 to oc-
cur with non-negligible probability. Figure 5 shows
that higher-prestige networks tend to be associated
with lower-diameter networks—that is, shorter path
lengths. This and the observation that strategic net-
works tend to have higher clustering suggest that a
pursuit of like centrality can account for high clus-
tering and low diameter, two features known to be
characteristic of real-world social networks.
Discussion
We have shown that like centrality-motivated agents
tend to exhibit many of the behaviors associated with
actual social actors. The struggle to maximize the
rate at which one receives gratification relative to his
or her social neighbors results in a system in which
strategic agents exchange likes at finite rates, consis-
tent with observations of online social networking. It
also enforces network geometries in which the proba-
bilities that those who share mutual friends are likely
to meet (high clustering) and that there exist edges
which connect distant parts of the network (small
Figure 5: Total prestiges for various network diameters.
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world).
The notion of prestige optimization assumed here
is not novel; it is well-documented that the pursuit of
prestige and honor with respect to cultural norms can
be a powerful social force. [6] It would be expected
then, especially among youthful coteries for which a
significant portion of social discourse occurs online,
that users of Facebook and other social websites be-
have according to an objective function such as like
centrality. This raises the possibility of determining
the precise degree to which like allocation is motivated
by Machiavellian strategy rather than an effectively
random criterion such as the degree to which the liker
approves of the post in question. Techniques like this
have been used before and have been successful in
elucidating network formation processes. [7]
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